Does Dying Hurt? Philodemus of Gadara, \u3ci\u3eDe Morte\u3c/i\u3e and Asclepiades of Bithynia by Pearcy, Lee
Bryn Mawr College
Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr
College
Greek, Latin, and Classical Studies Faculty Research
and Scholarship Greek, Latin, and Classical Studies
2012
Does Dying Hurt? Philodemus of Gadara, De
Morte and Asclepiades of Bithynia
Lee Pearcy
Bryn Mawr College, lpearcy@brynmawr.edu
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.brynmawr.edu/classics_pubs
Part of the Classics Commons
This paper is posted at Scholarship, Research, and Creative Work at Bryn Mawr College. http://repository.brynmawr.edu/classics_pubs/109
For more information, please contact repository@brynmawr.edu.
Custom Citation
Lee T. Pearcy, "Does Dying Hurt? Philodemus of Gadara, De Morte and Asclepiades of Bithynia." The Classical Quarterly 62.1 (2012):
211-222.
The Classical Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org/CAQ
Additional services for The Classical Quarterly:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
DOES DYING HURT? PHILODEMUS OF GADARA, DE MORTE AND ASCLEPIADES OF BITHYNIA
LEE T. PEARCY
The Classical Quarterly / Volume 62 / Issue 01 / May 2012, pp 211 - 222
DOI: 10.1017/S0009838811000620, Published online: 24 April 2012
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009838811000620
How to cite this article:
LEE T. PEARCY (2012). DOES DYING HURT? PHILODEMUS OF GADARA, DE MORTE AND ASCLEPIADES OF
BITHYNIA. The Classical Quarterly, 62, pp 211-222 doi:10.1017/S0009838811000620
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/CAQ, IP address: 68.238.220.52 on 13 Feb 2016
211Classical Quarterly 62.1 211–222 (2012) Printed in Great Britain
doi:10.1017/S0009838811000620 DOES DYING HURT?LEE T. PEARCY
DOES DYING HURT? PHILODEMUS OF 
GADARA, DE MORTE AND ASCLEPIADES OF 
BITHYNIA*
Near the beginning of the surviving part of Book 4 of About Death (De morte), 
the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus of Gadara takes up an urgent question: does 
it hurt to die? Epicureans believed that the soul is made of atoms and that death 
entails the separation of soul from body; if sensations including pain arise from the 
movement of atoms in the soul,1 does the movement of the soul when it separates 
from the body in death cause pain? If it does, then death, like all painful experi-
ences, will be something that a rational person will want to avoid, and the second 
leg of the Epicurean ‘fourfold remedy’ or tetrapharmakos, ‘death is nothing to us’, 
becomes wobbly if it does not break altogether.2 It has not been recognized that, 
in his answer to this question, Philodemus draws on medical theories that we can 
associate with his older contemporary Asclepiades of Bithynia. Reading the relevant 
passages of De morte with these theories in mind clarifies Philodemus’ argument 
and provides an insight into the intellectual milieu of Late Republican Rome.
There is nothing improbable in the suggestion that the philosopher Philodemus 
knew and was influenced by the physician Asclepiades. Both were Greek intel-
lectuals resident in Italy, with patrons in the Roman governing class. They were 
either near-contemporaries or only a generation apart. Philodemus was certainly 
well known at Rome by 55 B.C., when he figures in Cicero’s In Pisonem as a 
client of L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus; in fact, Philodemus addresses Piso in his 
work On the Good King according to Homer and in one of his epigrams. It used 
to be generally accepted that Asclepiades was active in Rome at about the same 
time, since Pliny places him in ‘the age of Pompey’. Elizabeth Rawson, though, 
has argued that Asclepiades must have been dead by 91 B.C., the dramatic date 
of Cicero’s De oratore, in which Crassus appears to refer to him as though he 
were no longer living.3 If we accept Rawson’s dating, then Philodemus will have 
known of Asclepiades as a fellow Greek active at Rome in the generation before 
his birth; if we believe Pliny, then they may well have met one another at Rome 
or on the Bay of Naples. Asclepiades, also, was the kind of physician-philosopher 
who would have appealed to Philodemus.4 The titles of works attributed to him 
* I am grateful to Prof. Richard Janko and Dr. Ben Henry for much-needed advice as I began 
work on Philodemus, and to an audience at Bryn Mawr College for questions and comments on 
an oral version. Errors and misunderstandings are mine alone.
1 Epicurus, Ep. Hdt. 63.
2 For the Epicurean ‘fourfold remedy’ (1. God should not concern us; 2. Death is nothing to 
us; 3. What is good is easy to obtain; 4. What is bad is easily avoided) see Phld. Adv. Soph. (P 
Herc. 1005) 5.9–13 Angeli and Epicurus, RS 1–4 with the commentary of C. Bailey, Epicurus: 
The Extant Remains (Oxford, 1926).
3 E. Rawson, ‘The life and death of Asclepiades of Bithynia’, CQ 32 (1982), 358–70.
4 G. Harig, ‘Die philosophische Grundlagen des medizinischen Systems des Asklepiades von 
Bithynien’, Philologus 127 (1983), 43–60.
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include a work on definitions and two commentaries on Hippocrates, and his medi-
cal theories, as we shall soon see, could be read with sympathy by an Epicurean.
I turn now to the text of Philodemus. Here with a change of one word (μ[έρη 
for μ[όρια in line 9) are lines 6–24 of P Herc. 1050, col. 8, as they appear in 
Benjamin Henry’s recent edition, followed by my translation of them.5 (I translate 
π[λεῖον ἢ μ[υρίων, which seems tolerably certain, in line 20 and διε]σ̣[παρ]μένη 
in line 17; for details, see Henry’s apparatus ad locc. and his n. 28 on p. 19):
Φήσομέν τε τὴν συμπάθιαν πρ[ὸς τὸ
σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ . [. . . . .
μετ̓ ὀχλήσεως αἰτία . [ . . . .]ς ἢ π[υ]κ[νού-
σ]ης ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μ[έρη τ]ῶν ζώ[ιων
ἢ διϊστανούσης, ἀλλ̓ οὐ φ[αμέ]ν̣ γε ἀδ[ύνα-  10
τον λυθῆναί ποτ̓ αὐτὴν [ὀλίγ]ης τυχο[ῦ-
σαν] ἑτεροιώσεως ἥτις [οὐ]κ ἄῤ̣ [ἐσ]τί τινος
ἀ]λγ[ηδό]νος α[ἰ]τία· λ[επ]τομερὴς γὰρ
οὖσ]α καὶ τελέως εὐκίν[ητος ἡ] ψ[υ]χὴ κα[ὶ
δι]ὰ τοῦτ̓ ἐκ μικροτάτ[ω]ν σ[υν]έστηκ[υῖα  15
καὶ λει]οτάτων καὶ περιφε[ρε]στά[τ]ων
. . .]σ̣[. . .]μένη καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο πολλὴν
ἀ]πορία[ν π]αρέ[χ]ουσα, πῶς οὐ[κ] ἐξίπτα-
ται λ[. . . . . . . . .]ων πόρων ἐν τῆι σα[ρ-
κὶ π[ . . . . .]ημ[ . . . . .;] ἢ̣ [ἐ]κ τίνος [οὐ]κ ἂν  20 
εἴπ[αιμ]ε[. . . . . . .]ο[.] αἰτία[ς . . . . .
τὴ[ν . . . . . . . . . . . . διά]κρισιν [ . . . ( . . ) δε-
δοίκα[ . . ν . . . . . . . . . ἄ]ποτετελεσ-
μέ[ν . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (.) ] αμ [ . . . .
We shall assert the common suffering of the soul in relation to the body; even if for the 
most part … with distress … cause …, as it either abnormally lumps together or separates 
the parts of living creatures, still we say that it is impossible that this common suffering 
should never be dissolved after undergoing a small transformation, which is not, to be 
sure, the cause of any pain. For the soul, being fine-particled and completely mobile, and 
accordingly composed of the smallest and smoothest and roundest particles, when it is 
dispersed throughout the body and for this reason causing much difficulty, surely just flies 
out through the pores in the flesh that are there ready for it in countless numbers. Or for 
what reason should we not say … the separation … are afraid of … once it is completed?
Fear of death may take several forms. We may, for example, fear that dying will 
bring with it transformation into another, less pleasant state, or that we will lose 
the good things that we now have, or that by dying we will be deprived of goods 
that we might have gained by living longer. Epicureans reject all of these notions 
and have, for the most part, good arguments against each one. Here, however, 
Philodemus is concerned with a fourth kind of fear that might be reasonable even 
for someone who rejected those just mentioned: the fear, which he attributes to 
an opponent (who may be the Stoic Apollophanes named in the previous column) 
that the moment of dying may be accompanied by terrible pains (μετ̓ ἄκρων 
ἀλγηδόνων … μετ̓ ὀχλήσεω[ς] ἀνυπερβ[λήτου) as the soul separates from the 
5 W.B. Henry, Philodemus, On Death (Atlanta, 2009). I have not included in my transcription 
of Henry’s text the sublinear asterisk that indicates a letter transcribed incorrectly in one of the 
disegni; see Henry, xxxiii.
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body. In the section before us, he addresses this fear. He first grants that pain 
affects both soul and body (lines 6–7). Then he suggests, quoting Epicurus’ descrip-
tion of the soul as a σῶμα λεπτομερές,6 that because the soul is made up of 
especially small, round atoms, this co-affection or sympathy will not cause any 
pain as the soul leaves the body. Finally, in lines 23–4 he seems to assert that 
whatever discomfort there might be must end almost immediately, just as soon as 
the soul is separated from the body. (Von Arnim’s suggestion ἀ]ποτετελεσμέ[νης 
ἀναισθητήσομεν in line 24 is at least plausible, though far from certain, and has 
influenced my interpretation of these fragmentary lines.)
The first and third of these assertions are firmly grounded in Epicurean doctrine. 
Epicurus thought that body and soul suffered together: ‘Think it not unnatural’, 
he wrote to a friend, ‘that when the flesh cries aloud, the soul cries too’.7 The 
soul, moreover, possesses the chief responsibility for sensation because it creates 
the power of sensation by communicating its motions to the body,8 but it retains 
this quality only so long as it is enclosed in a body. Once the atoms of soul, both 
those that resemble wind or heat and those that are even finer, are dispersed, both 
body and soul cease to have sensation (Ep. Hdt. 63–7). Epicurus also endorsed 
the belief that pain, yin to pleasure’s yang, could always be tolerated. Bodily pain, 
he held, is either acute or chronic; acute pain can be endured because it is soon 
over, and chronic pain is never so severe that it cannot be endured (RS 4). Any 
pain that accompanies death, Philodemus wants us to believe, must be not only 
tolerable but slight.
Thus Philodemus had a starting point for his discussion. But Epicurus had 
also left Philodemus with a problem. The interconnected activities and transforma-
tions and readiness of movement and processes of thought of the soul amount to 
sensation, as Epicurus himself suggested (Ep. Hdt. 63). Is it not the case that the 
separation of the soul from the body in death is an activity and a transformation, 
and therefore necessarily accompanied by sensation? Granted that after death we 
have no existence and therefore no sensation; even so, will we not feel something 
at the very moment of death when the atoms of soul separate from the body and 
are separated from each other, something that might very well be pain? On this 
point Epicurus is silent, at least in his preserved works, but Philodemus’ older con-
temporary Demetrius Laco was at least aware of the problem.9 Lucretius (3.350–5) 
affirms that sensation depends on the combination of soul and body and that the 
mind and soul, like the body, can be affected by disease and healed by medicine 
(3.445–525) but says nothing about the possibility that dying, the separation of 
soul and body, might be painful in itself. As James Warren observes, ‘Given the 
amount of time they spend discussing death, the Epicureans have surprisingly little 
to say about the ethical significance of the process of dying …’10 Although Warren 
includes Philodemus in this indictment, I want to suggest here that Philodemus in 
fact builds on Epicurus by using contemporary scientific and medical theory to 
explain the possibility that the moment of death might cause pain, and to explain 
in addition why any such pain must be trivial.
6 Ep. Hdt. 63.
7 Incertarum epistularum fragmenta 44, Bailey (n. 2), 131. Cf. also Ep. Hdt. 63.10, καὶ μὴν 
καὶ Óτι ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν πλείστην αἰτίαν κ.τ.λ.
8 A complicated issue. See Ep. Hdt. 64 with Bailey (n. 2), 228. Cf. also Lucr. 3.350–5.
9 P Herc. 1013 col. 18, quoted by Henry (n. 5), xvi.
10 J. Warren, Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics (Oxford, 2004), 13.
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ΜΕΛΗ, ΜΕΡΗ OR ΜΟΡΙΑ?
But first I must return to P Herc. 1050, col. 8, and in particular to line 9, a 
place at which the most recent editor and I hold slightly different views. Pain, 
Philodemus declares, is caused by the agglutination or dispersal of parts of living 
creatures, τὰ μ[έρη τ]ῶν ζώ[ιων (line 9). Μέρη was proposed by Siegfried Mekler 
in 1885,11 but until Henry’s path-breaking edition editors preferred to follow von 
Arnim’s suggestion of 1888 and print μέλη.12 I believe that Mekler’s restoration is 
correct. The chief problem with μέλη is that it makes no sense here. Plato could 
use μέλη and μέρη to refer to the ‘limbs and members’ of the body (Leg. 795e), 
but the words are not synonyms. Μέλη in medical or anatomical contexts are 
‘limbs’ – an arm, a leg or, by metonymy, the entire body (Il. 7.131). Μέρη are 
‘parts’ – of anything, but in medical contexts frequently organs like the stomach 
or liver (e.g. Gal. De loc. aff. 6.8.387 Kühn, τὰ μετέωρα μέρη τῶν ἐντέρων), 
structures like the thorax or abdomen, or distinct divisions of them (e.g. Arist. Hist. 
an. 493a11, Θώρακος δὲ μέρη τὰ μὲν πρόσθια τὰ δ̓ ὀπίσθια). Limbs are parts, 
but parts are not necessarily limbs.13 Further, an electronic search of the complete 
TLG corpus for any form of μέλος within five lines of any word beginning with 
πυκν- failed to produce any passage where μέλη were described as dense, closely 
textured or frequent except in musical contexts, where of course individual notes 
can come thick and fast (e.g. Pl. Leg. 812d). Μέρη, on the other hand, can easily 
be thought of as dense or closely compacted. From many examples I give two of 
a medical nature. Galen describes the way in which the upper digestive tract has 
been designed so as to make it possible for us to ingest hard, large or rough items 
of food. We could not do this, he says, if our digestive parts were not themselves 
hard and dense: ὑφ̓ ὧν ἐθλᾶτό τ̓ ἂν καὶ κατεξύετο τὰ μέρη μὴ σκληρὰ καὶ 
πυκνὰ γενόμενα (De usu partium 3.283K). Soranus (Gyn. 1.41) points out that 
spring is the best season for conception. In winter, you see, bodies are dense 
(πεπυκνωμένων τῶν σωμάτων) and, just like the earth, cannot easily receive seed, 
and summer makes everything lax, both bodies and their reproductive parts (μέρη).
Some who prefer μέλη want the participles in the phrase ἢ πυκνούσης 
ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μέλη τῶν ζῴων ἢ διϊστανούσης to mean something like ‘shrinks 
and swells’ or ‘contracts and expands’ the limbs.14 But no ancient theory of disease, 
as far as I know, made swelling or wasting of the limbs a distinguishing general 
feature of disease. Other interpreters take πυκνούσης ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μέλη τῶν 
ζῴων ἢ διϊστανούσης to mean that illness causes the limbs to contract and relax 
and so to shake violently, and they adduce the descriptions of epileptic seizure at 
11 S. Mekler, ΦΙΛΟΔΗΜΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΥ Δ. Philodemus Ueber den Tod, viertes Buch. 
SAWW 110.2, 305–54. Col. 8 is on p. 314.
12 H. von Arnim, ‘Philodemea’, RhM ser. 3, 43 (1888), 360–75; also, for example, T. Kuiper, 
Philodemus Over den Dood (Amsterdam, 1925) and M. Gigante, ‘L’inizio del quarto libro ‘Della 
morte’ di Filodemo’, Ricerche Filodemee 2 (Naples, 1983), 115–61.
13 See Galen, In Platonis Timaeum comentarii, fr. 2, Μέρη μὲν ὀνομάζεται πάντα τὰ 
συμπληροῦντα τὸ ὅλον ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅλον, ἰδίως δὲ μέλη τὰ τῶν ζῴων καλεῖται 
μέρη. 
14 So e.g. ‘condenses or swells the limbs of living things’, D. Armstrong, ‘All things to all 
men: Philodemus’ model of therapy and the audience of De morte’, in J.T. Fitzgerald, D. Obbink 
and G.S. Holland (edd.), Philodemus and the New Testament World, (Leiden, 2004), 15–54, at 
24.
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Lucretius 3.487–505 and Philodemus, De ira col. 8, 28–col. 9, 24 in support.15 But 
at De morte col. 8, 8–10 Philodemus is talking about illness in general, and there 
is no reason to specify epilepsy or any seizure disorder. None of these proposed 
interpretations can account for the most likely meanings of μέρη, πυκνόω, or 
διϊστάνω in an Epicurean context.
Henry believes that μέλη and μέρη are both just a little too short to fill the 
space available, and he points out that τὰ μόρια τῶν ζώιων occurs frequently in 
Aristotle. For these reasons he prints μόρια. He and I would agree, I think, that 
while μόρια seems to be a better fit and certainly makes better sense than μέλη, it 
is not possible to rule out μέρη.16 The phrase τὰ μέρη τῶν ζῴων is not unknown 
in Aristotle (e.g. Gen. an. 782a, Hist. an. 532b). Inspection of digital images of 
the papyrus has persuaded me that there is sufficient variation in the hand of the 
scribe, particularly in his handling of the letter mu, to accommodate either μέρη 
or μόρια. Certainty is impossible, but the case for μέρη becomes stronger if, as 
I argue here, it allows us to make better sense of Philodemus’ argument than 
μόρια. (Let me add that my conclusion, that Philodemus drew on Asclepiades for 
the theory of pain that informs De morte, can be reached through the phrase ἢ 
π[υ]κ[νούσ]ης ἢ διϊστανούσης even if μόρια proves to be indisputably correct.17)
WHAT ARE ΜΕΡΗ?
When Philodemus states that illness ‘lumps together or separates the particles of 
living creatures’, does he mean that it lumps or separates the Epicurean atoms 
of which those creatures are made? I do not think it likely that he does. Μέρος, 
which appears more than 40 times in Epicurus’ writings,18 is a slippery word that 
acquires its exact sense from its context. Epicurus uses μέρος to refer to a part 
of Epicurean doctrine (e.g. Ep. Hdt. 35.10; 36.4; 36.11) or to a portion of some 
larger structure without indication of size (e.g. τὸ μέρος τοῦτο τοῦ κόσμου, Ep. 
Pyth. 112.2). At Letter to Herodotus 58 he uses it to refer to hypothetical (and in 
his view, non-existent) divisions within the ‘minimum of sensation’ (τό ἐλάχιστον 
τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει), the smallest perceptible magnitude in which there can be no 
division into parts (διάληψιν μερῶν). He does not, however, seem to use μέρος 
to refer to Epicurean atoms.
I now focus on one passage in which μέρος describes units which, while very 
small, are clearly different from the atoms of which they are made. In Letter to 
Pythocles 106 Epicurus describes the formation of hailstones. It illustrates, I think, 
the Epicurean sense in which Philodemus uses μέρος at De Morte Book 4, col. 8:
15 e.g. von Arnim (n. 12), 363, ‘Etiam morbum, qui spasticus dicitur … cum mutatione 
animae coniunctum esse apparet, cum anima corporis membra alternis contrahat atque disten-
dat’; Gigante (n. 12), 152: ‘la forza del male scuota le membra del corpo’.
16 W. Benjamin Henry per litteras electronicas, October 28, 2009.
17 One would then argue that πυνκόω refers to aggregation of atomic or corpuscular particles, 
as it does at Ep. Hdt. 62, [οἱ ἄτομοι] πυκνὸν ἀντικόπτουσιν, and διστάνω to their separation, 
as at Ep. Hdt. 43, αἱ ἄτομοι … ες μακρὰν ἀπ̓ ἀλλήλων διιστάμεναι.
18 A search of the TLG corpus for all forms of μέρος in Epicurus returns 44 instances, but 
in some cases (e.g. Ep. Hdt. 66.10 and 74.2) it is uncertain whether an instance should be 
assigned to Epicurus or to the scholia which are embedded in the text of Diogenes Laertius’ 
Life of Epicurus.
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Χάλαζα συντελεῖται καὶ κατὰ πῆξιν ἰσχυροτέραν, πάντοθεν δὲ πνευματῶδων 
περίστασιν τινῶν καὶ καταμέρισιν· καὶ <κατὰ> πῆξιν μετριωτέραν ὑδατοειδῶν τινῶν 
<καὶ> ὁμοῦ ῥῆξιν, ἅμα τήν τε σύνωσιν αὐτῶν ποιουμένην καὶ τὴν διάρρηξιν πρὸς 
τὸ κατὰ μέρη συνίστασθαι πηγνύμενα καὶ κατὰ ἀθροότητα. (107) ἡ δὲ περιφέρεια 
οὐκ ἀδυνάτως μὲν ἔχει γίνεσθαι πάντοθεν τῶν ἄκρων ἀποτηκομένων καὶ ἐν τῇ 
συστάσει πάντοθεν, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ μέρη ὁμαλῶς περιϊσταμένων εἴτε ὑδατοειδῶν 
τινων εἴτε πνευματωδῶν.19
Hail is produced both by a stronger fitting together, a crowding around from all sides and 
separation of certain windy bodies, and as well by a more moderate fitting together of 
certain watery bodies and their simultaneous breaking up, which creates at one and the 
same time the coming-together of them and the breaking-up, as they combine by particles 
(μέρη) fitting together and by organized structures. The rounded shape, possibly, can 
happen as the corners melt away or in the joining from all sides, as is said, by particles 
(μέρη), either of watery bodies or of windy ones, evenly crowding around.
Bailey comments, ‘The text is uncertain and the meaning obscure’.20 Lucretius 
offers no illumination; if you want to know how hail and similar phenomena 
happen, he says, just extrapolate from what you already know about how the basic 
constituents of matter behave (6.527–34). It is clear, however, that the ‘watery 
bodies’ and ‘windy bodies’ cannot be atoms, for Epicurean atoms have only three 
qualities: size, weight and shape. The particles that come together κατὰ μέρη to 
make rounded hailstones must be larger particles with additional qualities of windi-
ness or wetness. Bailey (ad loc.) seems essentially right in his understanding of 
κατὰ μέρη … καὶ κατὰ ἀθροότητα as describing a two-fold process in which ‘the 
particles congeal, but in separate nuclei’. What Lucretius says about cloud formation 
sheds additional light on what Epicurus means by μέρη here. Clouds are formed 
when corpora (6.451, 484, 487) or semina aquai/aquarum (6.497, 507, 520) join 
together, first into small, tenuously coherent bodies, then into small clouds, and 
then into larger ones (6.451–8). Letter to Pythocles 106 establishes that the first, 
post-atomic stages of this process could be called μέρη.
Epicurus himself seems not to have developed a full account of such compound, 
molecular structures. In his 1896 edition of Lucretius Carlo Giussani appealed to 
Letter to Herodotus 69 and 52 to argue that ὄγκος was Epicurus’ technical term 
for such larger but still imperceptibly small structures.21 Giussani’s specific claim 
has not won general assent,22 but the two passages on which Giussanni relied, as 
well as Lucretius’ explication, make it clear that Epicureans found it necessary to 
hypothesize structures with perceptible qualities compounded of atoms but at or 
below the boundary of sense perception.
These ‘molecules’ help Epicureans to solve a problem arising from their fun-
damental postulates that only atoms and void have real existence and that atoms 
have only size, shape and weight. If this is the case, we might expect bodies 
19 I follow Usener and Bailey in reading <κατὰ> πῆξιν μετριωτέραν in preference to 
Arrighetti’s καὶ τῆξιν. It is not clear to me what ‘a melting of watery elements’ could mean, 
and Arrighetti’s translation (‘per ulteriore parziale liquefazione di alcuni elementi acquei’) seems 
to beg the question; see G. Arrighetti, Epicuro: Opere (Turin, 1960), 94.
20 Bailey (n. 2), 311.
21 C. Giussani, T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex, vol. 1: Studi Lucreziani (Turin, 
1896), 78–84.
22 e.g. D. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton, 1967), 12. Arrighetti (n. 19), 
464, however, accepts Giussani’s view.
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made of atoms to have only the qualities of their constituent elements, so that our 
world would contain neither colour nor smell nor taste, but only void and bodies 
of various sizes, shapes and weights. How do sensible qualities like colour arise, 
and what is the nature of their existence?
Epicurean ‘molecules’, as Giussani recognized, seem to be implied by Epicurus’ 
discussion of this problem. In Letter to Herodotus 68–9 he considers the relation-
ship between properties and the bodies of which they are predicated. He rules out 
the possibilities that qualities exist independently of bodies, that qualities have no 
existence at all, that qualities are incorporeal existences, and that they are sepa-
rable parts (μόρια) of body. Instead, he says, the qualities of a body permanently 
accompany it and make it what it is. A medium-sized, round, purple sphere, for 
example, is such a thing because those qualities are inseparable from it, and because 
we could not recognize it as such a thing if those qualities ceased to be part of it.
[sc. δοξαστέον] ἀλλ̓ ὡς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα καθόλου μὲν <ἐκ> τούτων πάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
φύσιν ἔχον ἀίδιον, οὐχ οἷον δ̓ εἶναι <ἐκ> συμπεφορημένων (ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν 
τῶν ὄγκων μεῖζον ἄθροισμα συστῇ ἤτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν 
τοῦδε τινὸς ἐλαττόνων), ἀλλὰ μόνον, ὡς λέγω, ἐκ τούτων ἁπάντων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ 
φύσιν ἔχον ἀίδιον.
Rather we should suppose that the whole body in its totality owes its own permanent 
existence to all these, yet not in the sense that it is composed of properties brought together 
to form it (as when, for instance, a larger structure is put together out of the parts which 
compose it, whether the first units of size or other parts smaller than itself, whatever it 
is), but only, as I say, that it owes its own permanent existence to all of them. (Bailey)
The clause in parentheses, ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ὄγκων μεῖζον ἄθροισμα 
συστῇ ἤτοι τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μεγεθῶν τοῦδε τινὸς ἐλαττόνων, 
confirms that Epicurus imagined bodies as composed of two kinds of part: the ‘first 
units of size’ (τῶν πρώτων … μεγεθῶν) and any other parts larger than these but 
smaller than the whole body. These ‘first units of size’, as Bailey recognized in his 
commentary on the passage, must be ‘“the first parts” or “molecules”, the minima 
of sensation’ described in Letter to Herodotus 58 as the minimum perceptible 
quantities (τὸ ἐλάχιστον τὸ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει). Here, as he often does, Epicurus 
expects us to extrapolate from size to shape, colour, weight and other qualities 
like the ones listed at the beginning of his discussion of qualities. There must be 
first units of colour, shape and weight just as there are first units of size; that is, 
bodies at the limit of perception, so that if they became any less red or cubical 
or heavy they would cease to be perceptible as such.
These minimum perceptible qualified bodies include, I suggest, the ‘windy’ 
and ‘watery’ bodies of Letter to Pythocles 106: the minimum bodies that can be 
perceived as having the quality of wind or water. At the same time, they are not 
atoms, for atoms do not have qualities other than size, shape and weight.
Lucretius appeals to the existence of such invisible but perceptible bodies to help 
possibly sceptical readers understand the reality of even smaller bodies, the atoms:
Nunc age, res quoniam docui non posse creari
de nilo neque item genitas ad nil revocari,
ne qua forte tamen coeptes diffidere dictis,
quod nequeunt oculis rerum primordia cerni,
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accipe praeterea quae corpora tute necessest
confiteare esse in rebus nec posse videri. (1.265–70)
Come now, since I have shown that things cannot be created from nothing and that once 
generated they cannot be called back to nothing, lest by chance you begin to distrust 
my words because the primary constituents of matter cannot be discerned with the eyes, 
understand in addition that there are bodies which you must admit exist in matter and 
yet cannot be seen.
As examples of such bodies with perceptible qualities but too small to be seen he 
adduces invisible bodies of wind (venti corpora caeca, 1.277, 295), scent, heat, 
cold and moisture. Clothing hung by the sea, he points out, becomes moist from 
what must be tiny, invisible particles of moisture: in parvas igitur partis dispergitur 
umor (1.309). These partes (in Greek, μέρη) cannot be atoms, for Lucretius is using 
them as evidence for the existence of atoms and they have perceptible qualities 
other than size, shape and weight. They correspond to the ‘windy’ and ‘watery 
bodies’ of Letter to Pythocles 106.
When Philodemus, then, speaks of τὰ μέρη τῶν ζώιων at De morte col. 8, line 
9, he refers not to atoms, but to some different and perhaps more complex particle. 
These particles, he states, cause sickness and pain when they become abnormally 
lumped together or separated. This description, as I shall now demonstrate, fits the 
ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι of Asclepiades of Bithynia and the medical theory that he developed.
ASCLEPIADES
Although many features of Asclepiades’ medical theories are unclear or controver-
sial, both ancient sources and modern scholars agree on a few points. Asclepiades 
explained physiological processes, including disease, in terms of theoretical or 
non-perceptible particles, which he probably called ὄγκοι. These particles moved 
through, into and out of the body through equally theoretical passages, πόροι. Some 
diseases were caused by impaction of the particles and blockage of the passages; 
other diseases, it seems, could be explained in a different way.
Controversy begins when we ask what our sources mean by describing 
Asclepiades’ particles as ἄναρμοι, θραυστοί, fragiles, or delicati or, as one source 
does, corpuscula quae solvantur. Could the ὄγκοι be broken into smaller bits? Are 
we to imagine one kind of fundamental particle or two? It seems, also, that our 
ancient sources are in conflict on the question of whether the particles had quali-
ties; Sextus Empiricus affirms that Asclepiades’ elemental particles were θραυστὰ 
… καὶ ποιά, ‘breakable and qualified’ (Pyr. 3.33), but Galen suggests that the 
ἄναρμον of Asclepiades was ἄποιον, ‘without qualities’ (De elementis secundum 
Hippocratem, 1.417 K). Caelius Aurelianus (fifth century A.D.), whose translation 
of Soranus’ (second century A.D.) On Acute Diseases is our most detailed source 
for Asclepiades’ doctrine, seems to agree, for he describes the corpuscula as sine 
 DOES DYING HURT? 219
ulla qualitate solita. Modern scholars for their part dispute Asclepiades’ intellectual 
affiliations; some join Galen in grouping him with the atomists and Epicureans,23 
some follow Sextus Empiricus in seeing him as a follower of Heraclides of Pontus,24 
and some derive his ideas from Plato’s Timaeus, Democritus, Strato of Lampsacus 
or atomists whom time has left as barely names.25 Diels, Stückelberger and recently 
Vallance have seen the influence of Erasistratus.26
There is no need to resolve these controversies about Asclepiades in a short 
article devoted to the interpretation of a single passage of Philodemus. Let me 
make only two brief observations. First, the weight of evidence seems to me in 
favour of the view that Asclepiades’ ὄγκοι were breakable (θραυστοί, fragiles, or 
on at least one plausible interpretation, ἄναρμοι), and that his theory included, as 
Caelius Aurelianus suggests, two kinds of elementary particle: first, fundamental 
particles, ὄγκοι, which behaved in some but not all ways like Epicurean atoms; 
and second, equally theoretical fragments (θραύσματα, fragmenta) into which these 
ὄγκοι could be broken and from which they could be reconstituted.27 Second 
(to reiterate), the idea of two kinds of theoretical particle is not incompatible 
with classical Epicureanism. Thus there is no reason for Philodemus or any other 
Epicurean to find Asclepiades’ medical theories uncongenial. Asclepiades was not 
an Epicurean, despite tendentious attempts in antiquity to lump him with the 
followers of Epicurus. Epicureans, however, would have found his materialistic 
physiology sympathetic. Philodemus drew in particular on Asclepiades’ theories of 
disease and of pain.
PHILODEMUS AND ASCLEPIADES ON DISEASE
Philodemus’ statement – if indeed that is what he says – that disease is a cause 
of distress when it abnormally lumps together or separates the particles of living 
creatures (μετ̓ ὀχλήσεως αἰτία[ς οὔση]ς ἢ πυκνούσης ἀσυμμέτρως τὰ μ[έρη 
τ]ῶν ζώ[ιων] ἢ διϊστανούσης, De morte col. 8.7–10) closely parallels the account 
23 The view of, among others, J. Pigeaud, La maladie de l’âme (Paris, 1981), 141.
24 On Asclepiades and Heraclides, see I.M. Lonie, ‘The ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι of Heraclides of 
Pontus’, Phronesis 9 (1964), 156–64, and ‘Medical theory in Heraclides of Pontus’, Mnemosyne 
4th ser. 18 (1965), 126–43, and especially H.B. Gottschalk, Heraclides of Pontus (Oxford, 1980), 
37–57. As J. Vallance, The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia (Oxford, 1990), 12 observes, 
‘there are no non-doxographical references to Heraclides’ corpuscular theory which do not also 
include Asclepiades’.
25 Timaeus: M. Wellmann, ‘Asklepiades aus Bithynien von einem herrschenden Vorurteil 
befreit’, Neue Jahrbücher 21 (1908), 684–703. Democritus: M. Wellmann, ‘Spuren Demokrits 
von Abdera im Corpus Hippocraticum’, Archeion 11 (1929), 297–330. Strato: H. Diels, ‘Über 
das physikalische System des Straton’, Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie (1893), 101–27.
26 A. Stückelberger, Vestigea Democritea: Die Rezeption der Lehre von den Atomen in der 
antiken Naturwissenschaft und Medizin. Schweizerische Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 17 
(Basel, 1984), esp. 101–16; Vallance (n. 24), 123–30.
27 Caelius Aurelianus De morbis acutis 1.105: primordia namque corporis primo constituerat 
[sc. Asclepiades] atomos, [secunda] corpuscula intellectu sensa sine ulla qualitate solita, atque 
ex initio comitata, aeternum moventia. quae suo incursu offensa mutuis ictibus in infinita partium 
fragmenta solvantur magnitudine atque schemate differentia; quae rursum eundo sibi adiecta vel 
coniuncta omnia faciant sensibilia … I keep secunda or emend to secundo and follow Gottschalk 
(n. 24), 56–7 in taking corpuscula as the antecedent of quae … solvantur and fragmenta as the 
antecedent of quae … faciant, so that the fragmenta are identical to the atomos of the previous 
clause. See also Vallance (n. 24), 18–21. I confess that I do not see what is meant by sine ulla 
qualitate solita, unless it refers to sensible qualities.
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of Asclepiades’ explanation of fever given by Sextus Empiricus in the geometrical 
book of his Against the Professors. Because Sextus was himself a medical man, he 
is unlikely to have misunderstood Asclepiades’ theory, and because in this passage 
he is simply giving an example of one kind of ὑπόθεσις used in argumentation, 
he has no reason to distort the theory that he reports:
οὕτω γοῦν τρισὶν ὑποθέσεσι κεχρῆσθαί φαμεν τὸν Ασκληπιάδην εἰς κατασκευὴν τῆς 
τὸν πυρετὸν ἐμποιούσης ἐνστάσεως, μιᾷ μὲν ὅτι νοητοί τινές εἰσιν ἐν ἡμῖν πόροι, 
μεγέθει διαφέροντες ἀλλήλων, δευτέρᾳ δὲ ὅτι πάντοθεν ὑγροῦ μέρη καὶ πνεύματος ἐκ 
λόγῳ θεωρητῶν ὄγκων συνηράνισται δι᾽ αἰῶνος ἀνηρεμήτων, τρίτῃ δὲ ὅτι ἀδιάλειπτοί 
τινες εἰς τὸ ἐκτὸς ἐξ ἡμῶν ἀποφοραὶ γίνονται, pot mn pleouj ποτὲ δὲ ἐλάττους 
πρὸς τὴν ἐνεστηκυῖαν περίστασιν.
So, then, we say that Asclepiades has used three ‘hypotheses’ for his demonstration of 
the blockage (ἔνστασις) causing fever: first, that there are in us certain non-perceptible 
pores differing from one another in size; second, that particles (μέρη) of moisture and air 
are gathered from everywhere from theoretically observed and eternally moving corpuscles 
(ὄγκοι); third, that certain constant emanations are sent forth from within us to the outside, 
sometimes more and sometimes less according to the condition at hand. (Math. 3.5)
Caelius Aurelianus provides some detail: Asclepiades held that severe fevers were 
caused by blockage of the corpuscles; quotidian fevers, he reasoned, were caused 
by blockage of large corpuscles, tertian fevers by blockage of smaller ones and 
quartan fevers by blockage of the smallest (Morb. acut. 1.107–8).
In Sextus’ account of Asclepiades’ theory and in Philodemus, De morte Book 
4, certain particles called μέρη are implicated in the cause of disease. Neither 
Philodemus nor Asclepiades makes these μέρη the fundamental particles, atoms 
or ὄγκοι, of his physical theory. In Asclepiades as reported by Sextus the μέρη 
are physiological entities compounded from the fundamental particles (ἐκ λόγῳ 
θεωρητῶν ὄγκων). They have sensible qualities, wetness and airiness. The par-
allel with Epicurus’ conjectural explanation of hail is exact. Epicurus wonders 
whether hailstones arose when watery and windy bodies (ὑδατοειδῶν τινων 
εἴτε πνευματωδῶν) come together from all sides (πάντοθεν) in particles (κατὰ 
μέρη). Asclepiades hypothesizes that μέρη of moisture and air (ὑγροῦ μέρη καὶ 
πνεύματος) come together from all sides (πάντοθεν) to create the conditions in 
which fever and other diseases arise. Philodemus would have found much in 
Asclepiades’ doctrine to remind him of Epicurus, and he used Asclepiades’ ideas 
to defend the second leg of the tetrapharmakos against those who argued that 
dying must hurt.
PHILODEMUS AND ASCLEPIADES ON PAIN
Although Philodemus found Asclepiades’ aetiology of disease congenial, it was not 
his chief reason for bringing the Bithynian’s theories into Book 4 of De morte. 
His primary concern was with pain, and with the question of whether severe pain 
inevitably accompanied dying. His opponents had alleged that the strong bond 
joining soul and body could not be dissolved without correspondingly strong pains 
(ἀξιούντω[ν ἀ]δύν[ατον εἶναι] | τὴν ἀνυπέρβλητον λ[ύ]εσθαι συ[μφυΐ] | αν μὴ 
μετ̓ ὀχλήσεω[ς] ἀνυπερβ[λήτου], De morte 4, P Herc. 1050 col. 8, 3–5). To 
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refute them, Philodemus needed a theory of pain that would let him explain how 
the Epicurean soul, a λεπτομερὲς σῶμα made up of the smallest, roundest and 
smoothest of atoms, could leave the body with little or no pain. He found such 
a theory in Asclepiades.
Caelius Aurelianus, supplemented by an earlier but arguably more tendentious 
account in Galen, provides our most extensive report of Asclepiades’ theory of 
pain. According to Caelius, Asclepiades held that pain arose from blockage of 
larger corpuscles (nam dolor maiorum corpusculorum statione fiet, De morb. acut. 
1.119). For this reason he refused to prescribe bloodletting in cases of phrenitis. 
That disease, he believed, was likely caused by blockage of small corpuscles in 
narrow pores, and thus sufferers felt no pain (phrenitici igitur nullo dolore vexantur, 
siquidem angustiis in viis parvorum facta videatur statio). Asclepiades, as we have 
already seen, could attribute different symptoms to the action of different sizes of 
corpuscle when blockage took place (see above, p. 220).
Galen considers pain in De elementis 1.417–18 K, 486ff. K and at De con-
stitutione artis medicae 1.248 K in the context of a larger argument about the 
nature of physiological change. Galen wants to establish that physiological change 
happens when the four Hippocratic elements act on one another by undergoing 
change themselves or by causing change in another element. He thus wants to 
show that all explanations hypothesizing either one kind of substance or unchanging 
fundamental constituents like atoms fail to account for the phenomena. Pain is an 
undeniable phenomenon and gives him an undeniable minor premise:
εἰ ἀπαθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς στοιχεῖον οὐκ ὀδυνηθήσεται· ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀδυνᾶται· 
οὐκ ἄρa ἐστιν ἀπαθές. εἰ δὲ καὶ πλείω λέγοι τις εἶναι τὰ στοιχεῖα, μὴ μέντοι γε 
ἀλλοιούμενα, καὶ ἐπ̓ ἐκείνων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐρωτηθήσεται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. 
εἰ ἀπαθῆ τῆς σαρκός ἐστι τὰ στοιχεῖα, οὐκ ἀλγήσει· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀλγεῖ· οὐκ ἄρa 
ἐστιν ἀπαθῆ τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς στοιχεῖα. ὁ μὲν οὖν πρότερος λόγος ἀνατρέπει τήν τε 
τῶν ἀτόμων, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνάρμων, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐλαχίστων ὑπόθεσιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν 
δεύτερον ἥ τε τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν ἀναιρεῖται δόξα, καὶ ἡ Ἐμπεδοκλέους.
If the element making up flesh is impassive, it will not feel pain. But it does feel pain. 
Therefore it is not impassive. Even if someone should say that the elements are several, 
but not capable of change, the same argument will be posed against them in the same 
way: if the elements making up flesh are impassive, they will not feel discomfort. But 
they do feel discomfort. Therefore they are not impassive. The first argument overturns 
the hypothesis of atoms and that of anarmoi and that of minima; the second removes the 
doctrine of homoiomeries and that of Empedocles. 
  (De constitutione artis medicae 1.248 K)
Here Galen confirms Caelius’ testimony that the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι of Asclepiades 
were involved in Asclepiades’ explanation of pain. Galen proceeds, however, to 
suggest what seems to be a different account of how the anarmoi produced pain. 
He asserts that mere separation and conjunction will not produce pain, because in 
order for pain to occur, something must either undergo change or pass entirely out 
of existence. ‘And so’, he continues, ‘the breakable anarmon of Asclepiades will 
not feel pain when broken, for it is without perception’ (οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἄναρμον 
τὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου θραυστὸν ὂν ὀδυνήσεται θραυόμενον, ἀναίσθητον γὰρ ἐστiν, 
De constitutione artis medicae 1.249 K).
Galen’s remark may provide support for the idea that Asclepiades’ ὄγκοι were 
breakable, but it does not support a notion that Asclepiades made pain a con-
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sequence of the dissolution of his fragile particles and not of their blockage in 
theoretical passages. Galen often reaches for any stick to beat whatever dog he 
has chosen as his opponent; in this case, he assigns to Asclepiades a view that 
Asclepiades never held. The circumstantial testimony of Caelius Aurelianus, which 
is consistent with the accounts of Sextus Empiricus and other witnesses who make 
blockage and flow the foundation of Asclepiades’ nosology, gives a true picture 
of Asclepiades’ theory of pain.
Philodemus, then, could ask his audience to believe something like this: disease, 
as Asclepiades teaches, results from blockage of theoretical particles in theoreti-
cal passages. Blockage of larger particles causes pain; conversely, diseases like 
phrenitis, in which only small particles are blocked, are not accompanied by pain. 
The soul, as Epicurus teaches, is composed of tiny, smooth, round atoms. When, 
therefore, these small, smooth, round atoms fly out of the body upon death, exiting 
through the myriad πόροι also postulated by Asclepiades, there will be little or no 
blockage, and little or no pain. Whatever there is will cease immediately when our 
dying is over, and we are dead.
Our evidence does not, I think, allow us to know in detail how Philodemus 
interpreted Asclepiades. He may just possibly have thought, as Galen believed 
he did, that Asclepiades’ ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι were equivalent to Epicurean atoms or, 
as argued here, he may have seen them as possessing qualities other than size, 
weight and shape, and therefore as equivalent to minima of perception like the 
windy and watery bodies that formed hailstones. Or, in a treatise addressed to an 
audience of Epicureans, members of other sects, and even non-philosophers,28 he 
may have wanted to finesse technical issues in atomistic theory. If so, then μέρη 
was a good word to choose. For Philodemus, Asclepiades’ theory of pain offered 
a way to ground his argument that separation of soul and body was painless, or at 
worst accompanied by only slight and bearable pain, in a widely accepted medical 
theory of his day. As Elizabeth Rawson observes, there may have been ‘no intel-
lectual figure at work in Rome in the period of the late Republic who had more 
originality and influence than the Bithynian doctor Asclepiades’.29 
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